Dual Chokepoint Crisis: Hormuz Closure and Red Sea Attacks Leave Container Shipping With No Way Out

The US and Israeli military strikes against Iran that began on 28 February have triggered a simultaneous disruption of both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, creating a dual chokepoint crisis without precedent in modern container shipping. For the first time, the industry faces the effective closure of the only sea passage into the Persian Gulf alongside confirmed attacks on Red Sea shipping — leaving carriers with no maritime workaround for Gulf-bound cargo and forcing a comprehensive regional withdrawal.

The immediate impact is centred on the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps broadcast VHF warnings declaring the waterway closed to all shipping, warnings confirmed by UK Maritime Trade Operations and the EU naval mission EUNAVFOR ASPIDES. Although General Mohsen Rezaei told the Financial Times on 1 March that the strait remained open to tankers “until further notice,” he simultaneously designated US warships as “legitimate targets” — a contradiction that speaks for itself. Bloomberg ship-tracking data showed only a handful of vessels exiting the strait on Sunday, with none entering — a de facto blockade regardless of official statements.

The threat moved from rhetorical to kinetic on 1 March. Oman’s Maritime Security Centre confirmed that the Palau-flagged tanker Skylight was struck approximately five nautical miles north of Khasab Port. Four of the vessel’s twenty crew members were injured and evacuated for medical treatment. UK Maritime Trade Operations separately reported two vessels struck in the region. The Skylight, which appears to be under US sanctions, was the first confirmed maritime attack since strikes began — but the targeting of a sanctioned vessel suggests Iran or its proxies are initially focusing on politically expedient targets rather than neutral commercial shipping.

Linerlytica estimates that approximately 170 containerships with a combined capacity of around 450,000 TEU — roughly 1.4 per cent of the global fleet — are currently inside the Persian Gulf and unable to exit through the strait. The congestion extends across vessel types: at least 150 tankers have dropped anchor in open Gulf waters according to Reuters estimates based on MarineTraffic data, and 14 LNG carriers have slowed or stopped near the strait according to Kpler analyst Laura Page. The resulting competition for limited anchorage and terminal capacity at mixed-use facilities such as Fujairah is compounding operational disruption for container vessels already unable to transit. Hapag-Lloyd issued a customer advisory suspending all vessel transits through the Strait of Hormuz until further notice, describing the decision as “not discretionary but a necessary response to the current conditions and regulatory restrictions.” CMA CGM ordered its vessels inside or heading for the Gulf to proceed to shelter. Maersk said it was coordinating with security partners on all operations in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

The distinction between the Hormuz crisis and the Red Sea disruption that has dominated container shipping since late 2023 is what elevates this from a severe disruption to a structurally different category of risk. The Red Sea has a bypass — Cape of Good Hope routing adds 10 to 14 days and significant fuel costs, but cargo still moves. The Strait of Hormuz has no equivalent. It is the sole maritime passage connecting the Persian Gulf to the open ocean. When it closes, Gulf ports — including DP World’s Jebel Ali, which handled 15.5 million TEU in 2024 — are simply cut off. There is no longer route, no alternative canal, no workaround. Cargo does not move slower; it stops.

Vizion estimates that approximately 135,000 TEU were in transit through the region when strikes began, carrying cargo valued at just under $4 billion. Of that, roughly 22,000 TEU worth an estimated $877 million was destined for the US or Europe. CMA CGM’s vessel annex, obtained by Container Management, shows 14 ships sheltering inside the Gulf across services including BIGEX, CIMEX1, MIDAS and KARIBU, with seven more vessels bound for the Gulf diverted. WTCP Intelligence vessel activity data from Jebel Ali confirms CMA CGM Galapagos, APL Gwangyang and H Cygnus reporting positions at the port, with declining vessel calls and rising anchorage numbers consistent with shelter-in-place operations.

War risk insurance is responding at unprecedented speed. Marsh estimates near-term hull insurance rate increases for Gulf transits could range from 25 to 50 per cent, with Dylan Mortimer, Marsh’s marine hull UK war leader, noting that the primary risks centre on vessel boarding and seizure by Iranian forces. Brokers confirmed that cancellation notices were issued over the weekend — before markets reopened — signalling the urgency of insurers’ reassessment. Bimco’s Jakob Larsen warned that ships with business connections to the US or Israel approaching the area may not be able to obtain coverage at all.

Prior to the latest escalation, war risk premiums for Hormuz transits stood at approximately 0.25 per cent of insured hull and machinery value. Industry sources indicate these could now reach 0.5 per cent or higher. For a container vessel valued at $150 million, that translates to a premium increase from $375,000 to $750,000 for a single transit — costs that will inevitably be passed through to shippers as war risk surcharges. The US Navy has told companies it cannot guarantee the safety of commercial vessels anywhere in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the North Arabian Sea, or the Strait of Hormuz.

On the freight rate side, Xeneta data showed spot rates from China to the UAE had already risen 5 per cent in the ten days preceding the strikes, reaching $1,572 per FEU. Peter Sand, Xeneta’s chief analyst, said the military operation had shattered any prospects of a large-scale return of container shipping to the Red Sea in 2026.

The Red Sea closure is now confirmed rather than merely threatened. Two senior Ansar Allah officials told the Associated Press on 28 February that the movement would resume missile and drone attacks on Red Sea shipping, with the first strike possible “as soon as tonight.” This followed a televised address by Ansar Allah leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi declaring full solidarity with Iran and describing this as both an official and popular position. The movement had paused large-scale maritime attacks from approximately 11 November 2025, following a regional de-escalation linked to the Gaza ceasefire and a tacit agreement with the Trump administration. That pause is now over.

Bimco has warned that previous Houthi targeting patterns extended beyond flag state to include ships perceived to have ownership, chartering, trading, or corporate affiliations connected to Israel or the United States — a broad definition that encompasses a significant share of global container tonnage. CMA CGM has suspended Suez Canal transits indefinitely and rerouted services via the Cape of Good Hope, pulling three vessels — CMA CGM Congo, APL Paris and APL Le Havre — away from the Bab el-Mandeb strait.

The question of how long this lasts is the central uncertainty. Larsen offered a measured assessment, noting that US air and naval superiority would eventually establish sufficient security for commercial shipping to resume. But the historical precedent counsels caution on what “eventually” means. The last sustained disruption of Strait of Hormuz shipping occurred during the Tanker War of 1984 to 1988, when Iran and Iraq conducted anti-shipping campaigns that persisted for four years despite Western naval intervention. Some 411 vessels were attacked during that conflict, 239 of them petroleum tankers. US air and naval superiority was present then too — Operation Earnest Will established convoy escorts from 1987 — but it shortened the disruption rather than preventing it. The anti-shipping campaigns ended only with the Iran-Iraq ceasefire in August 1988.

Iran’s maritime capabilities have expanded significantly since the 1980s. The Congressional Research Service estimates Iran now holds approximately 6,000 naval mines, compared with a smaller and less sophisticated inventory during the Tanker War. Tehran has also developed small submarines, advanced anti-shipping missiles, and large numbers of fast attack boats designed for swarming tactics. During the Tanker War, Iran relied on air-to-surface missiles originally designed for armoured land vehicles and relatively ineffective Sea Killer cruise missiles; it now fields a substantially more capable maritime force. The implication is that even under conditions of US naval dominance, disruption can persist for extended periods.

Overland alternatives exist in theory, but the infrastructure to handle Gulf container volumes by road or rail does not currently exist at the required scale. Saudi Arabia’s rail network remains under development, with the Tabuk-NEOM segment not expected to achieve operational capacity before 2029 at the earliest — and Saudi megaproject timelines have consistently slipped. Truck routes through Oman offer limited throughput. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC, which was conceived partly as a diversification option away from Suez dependency, remains years from operational viability — and carries its own vulnerability in the current crisis. The corridor’s dependence on Haifa as a Mediterranean terminus means that the same geopolitical dynamics threatening Hormuz also compromise IMEC’s most critical segment. If Hormuz remains effectively closed for weeks rather than days, the question of overland alternatives will move from theoretical to urgent. But for the near term, there is no ready substitute for maritime access to the Gulf.

Marco Forgione, director general of the Chartered Institute of Export and International Trade, has warned that supply chain disruption could last months, with effects potentially extending through the quarter and into early summer. Government advisories continue to escalate: Greece has instructed all Greek-flagged vessels to avoid the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz; Japan’s NYK Line has ordered its vessels not to enter the strait; and the US Maritime Administration issued an advisory requiring American-flagged vessels to maintain a 30-nautical-mile standoff from US military vessels.

For container shipping, the strategic calculus has shifted fundamentally. The Red Sea crisis, for all its disruption, was manageable — longer routes, higher costs, but continuous service. A Hormuz closure is qualitatively different. Carriers cannot simply add transit days; they must find entirely new logistics solutions for a region that includes one of the world’s top ten container ports. The situation remains fluid, but the direction is clear: the industry is now operating in a dual chokepoint environment with confirmed attacks at both pressure points and no maritime workaround for the Gulf.