Colombo is the Indian Ocean’s best substitute for Jebel Ali. It may not be enough.

Colombo has the connectivity. Whether it has the physical capacity to absorb a meaningful share of Jebel Ali’s redirected container traffic is the question carriers are now trying to answer in real time. Speaking at the S&P Global TPM conference in Long Beach on 2 March, ONE CEO Jeremy Nixon described “a huge amount of disruption and congestion at South Asian ports Mundra, Mumbai, Colombo” as a direct consequence of Jebel Ali going non-operational — a statement that confirms carriers are not merely exploring Colombo as an option but already routing cargo there, under pressure and without the luxury of planned network adjustments.

WTCP liner connectivity data explains why. Colombo’s LSCI stands at 736.9 as of Q4 2025, up from 606 just three years ago — a trajectory that reflects the port’s growing role as the Indian Ocean’s primary transhipment relay. In the context of this crisis, that number matters because the port it needs to substitute for, Jebel Ali, carried an LSCI of 791 before the Strait of Hormuz closed. No other available alternative comes close: Mundra sits at 639, Tanjung Pelepas at 576, Salalah — the only Gulf-accessible port CM identified in our earlier analysis — at just 237. In connectivity terms, Colombo is the nearest available replacement. But connectivity measures how many services call; it does not measure how many additional boxes a port can physically handle.

That is where the picture tightens. Colombo handled a record 8.29 million TEU in 2025, with transhipment accounting for roughly 80% of throughput. January 2026 saw transhipment volumes surge a further 15% year-on-year. The port has added significant infrastructure: Adani’s Colombo West International Terminal brought 1.6 million TEU of annual capacity online between November 2024 and February 2025, with phase 2 targeting 3.2 million TEU by December 2026. The East Container Terminal added a third berth. Theoretical capacity is now heading toward 15 million TEU. But theoretical capacity at a transhipment-dominated port is not the same as surge-absorbable capacity — it assumes steady-state operations, committed alliance rotations running to schedule, and yard space cycling predictably. Ad-hoc Gulf diversions compete for berth windows, yard density, and equipment with Colombo’s existing customers, and the port was already described as having yards “choked with boxes” during earlier Red Sea diversions before this crisis began. A realistic estimate of how much additional volume Colombo can absorb without degrading service reliability for its committed rotations? Likely well below the headline headroom.